29 Lis
2020
29 Lis
'20
23:11
Hello Ulrich,
thanks for your remarks. So if I understand it correctly, you have to have the same
resource record set of ZSKs (the public parts of the keys) on all authoritative's with
the signature from the KSK, maybe in an offline fashion, but the servers can use a key
which private part is only known to them. Is there a special place on the public side
where to store both KSKs and ZSKs with the signature of it by the KSK, or should this
simply be put in the zone file which knot uses to serve the rest of the zone?
Best regards
Nils
On 24.11.20 14:55, Ulrich Wisser wrote:
Hi Nils,
Multi-signer setups are not trivial, in-fact that is the cutting edge of DNSSEC right
now.
Please have a look at Shumons excellent RFC https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8901
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8901> for exactly that use-case.
In-short:
- Same algorithm on all instances
- You absolutely need to synchronize ZSK between instances
- KSK can be shared or separate
My recommendation would be to use ECDSA and not bother with the ask roll overs.
Same ZSK on all instances. Depending on your security requirements I would
consider offline KSK.
/Ulrich
On 21 Nov 2020, at 17:40, Nils Trampel
<nils(a)trampel.org> wrote:
Hello,
as I plan to migrate an existing DNS setup to Knot, not only for deploying DNSSEC but
also for synthesizing some records using mod-synthrecord, I am not sure as how to setup
online signing when having multiple public authoritative name servers. My uncertainty is,
if it is necessary to give them the same ZSKs and do the key rollover from the outside, or
if the chain of trust isn't severed when they generate their own ZSKs based from a
common KSK or even their distinct KSKs, and therefore provide different signatures.
Best regards and thanks,
Nils
--
Nils Trampel
GPG: 0x012BADD8
--
https://lists.nic.cz/mailman/listinfo/knot-dns-users