Hi Libor,
hi Daniel,
today we were finally able to isolate and to reproduce the problem.
We made an issue in gitlab because it's much easier to read when
everything is formatted.
https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/issues/721
BR,
Thomas
On 18.03.21 10:32, libor.peltan wrote:
Hi Thomas,
do you please have any updates to your issue?
Could you perhaps try to somehow clone your environment so that you had
the issue reproduced in a non-production setup ready for some more
experiments?
First of all, I wonder if after you add a new zone to your configuration
and instead of re-configuring the server, sign the zone first with
`kzonesign -r`, the same behavior would be observed...
Sorry for not helping you yet, but we are struggling understanding
what's going on at your setup :(
BR,
Libor
Dne 14. 03. 21 v 8:53 Daniel Salzman napsal(a):
> Hi Thomas,
>
> You could try purging possibly orphaned data:
> # knotc -f zone-purge -- +orphan
>
> Please make a backup of the defective situation first!
>
> Do you think that you could prepare and share (just with us) a minimal
> reproducer of the issue?
> It would help a lot with the debugging.
>
> Best,
> Daniel
>
> On 3/14/21 12:14 AM, Thomas wrote:
>> Hi Libor,
>>
>> we experience the same behavior after changing the config. Still 2 KSK
>> (and 2 ZSK) are being created after signing a zone. One with Alg 8 and
>> one with Alg 10. The one with Alg 8 is being used for signing and a
>> rollover is started immediately after signing.
>>
>> Don't now how to get out of the situation. Somehow there must be a
>> reference to the old Alg 8 somewhere. No idea why a new zone is singed
>> with Alg 8.
>>
>> Is there a way to clean up all the DNSSEC related data somehow? Actually
>> I would be able to un-sign and purge all zones, we are only signing a
>> few until now. But I don't know if this will solve the issue.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Thomas
>>
>>
>>
>> On 09.03.21 13:40, libor.peltan wrote:
>>> Hi Thomas,
>>>
>>> yes, it shall be very smooth to simply remove the 'share' option
from
>>> configuration and continue as before.
>>>
>>> The idea of shared KSK was generally good and a surprising enhancement,
>>> but you might have fallen to a random bug in rarely deployed
>>> configuration combo.
>>>
>>> I'm curious to hear if your issue disappears once you change the
>>> config.
>>>
>>> Please let me know,
>>>
>>> Libor
>>>
>>> Dne 09. 03. 21 v 13:15 Thomas E. napsal(a):
>>>> Thanks for the hint with the "cds-cdnskey-publish: always"
issue.
>>>>
>>>> We are using shared ksk policy beause we thought it might be a good
>>>> idea
>>>> to reduce the amount of keys in the database. We are going to sing
>>>> more
>>>> than 10K zones and thought it might be a good thing to use shared keys
>>>> to speed up backups and restores.
>>>> But if this causes the actual problem I will change it of course.
>>>> Do you
>>>> know if it's safe to remove the shared policy attribute from the
>>>> config?
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Thomas
>>>>
>>>> On 08.03.21 17:55, Tuomo Soini wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 8 Mar 2021 17:09:54 +0100
>>>>> "Thomas E." <list(a)crashcom.info> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> A KSK and ZSK with Alg RSASHA256 have been created and the zone
was
>>>>>> signed. An algorithm rollover is triggered right after signing.
I
>>>>>> don't understand why RSASHA256 is still being used.
>>>>> This is a very wild guess but I'd suspect this has something to
do
>>>>> with
>>>>> ksk-shared: true, note the config below.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> policy:
>>>>>>>>> - id: shared
>>>>>>>>> algorithm: RSASHA512
>>>>>>>>> ksk-size: 2048
>>>>>>>>> zsk-size: 1024
>>>>>>>>> zsk-lifetime: 30d
>>>>>>>>> ksk-lifetime: 365d
>>>>>>>>> ksk-shared: true
>>>>>>>>> ksk-submission: resolver
>>>>>>>>> nsec3: true
>>>>>>>>> cds-cdnskey-publish: always
>>>>> Btw. cds-cdnskey-publish: always is against instructions in rfc.
>>>>> those
>>>>> should only be published for rollover only.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is there some reason for using shared ksk?
>>>>>