Could you share your setup design with us?
Knot will be a bump-in-the-wire signer (in current BIND terminology this would
be an inline-signer) which transfers zones from a hidden PowerDNS primary. All
but one zone will be signed with multiple keys and automatic KSK and ZSK
rollovers. All keys generated/stored/obtained on/from Thales nCipher HSMs
accessed via PKCS#11.
There is one internal TLD which requires special behavior: it requires
automatic ZSK rollovers, but the KSK must not roll until Knot is specifically
instructed to roll it, and when that happens, it must be rolled with RFC5011
semantics (except that the standby times will be 60 and not the default of 30
days). It is perfectly ok to execute this procedure "manually" by issuing
`keymgr' commands; further automation is not required.
I don't think there's anything particularly special about this setup other than
the requirement for the one zone.
You might have inferred from previous communication that this setup is
(finally!) replacing a bunch of OpenDNSSEC signers; we feel Knot is far more
reliable and stable than that software ever was.
Best regards,
-JP