Hi,
we've had knot in use for years now and are still using version 1.6.7. I
We've recently migrated e-mail to exchange online. I've been asked to update the MX record in the zone to point to mail.protection.outlook.com.
I initially tried to simply replace the current value by mail.protection.outlook.com but then the name of the zone is added to the value. This is not a valid record.
I see no way to update the MX record to this value. Any suggestions?
Thanks in advance for the feedback.
Kind regards,
Dirk
There is an Internet draft (
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-chan…)
that describes a mechanism to facilitate the operation consisting of
changing the DNS delegation for a signed DNS zone. Since this is a draft, I
do not expect for Knot to provide support for it already (in fact, I know
it does not, for it involves signing a DNSKEY RR, which Knot does not do)
but I wonder whether this is something that is in Knot's roadmap?
Dear Guru(s),
If the following questions have already been asked, I do apologize and
would very much appreciate the pointers to where I can read the answer(s).
I am currently ‘running’ a DNSsec-signed zone using Alg-8 [RSA/SHA2-256].
However, I would very much like to DNSsec-sign and publish my zone with two
different algorithms (say, Alg-8 [RSA/SHA2-256] + Alg-13
[ECDSA-P256/SHA2-256]) *simultaneously*,
in case the client-validators out there cannot process one algorithm or the
other (never mind that they both are the ‘MUST’ in RFC 8624).
It also is an opportunity to train myself in case I need to ‘add’ the third
one (say, Alg-15 [ED25519]) or ‘migrate’ to the Alg-13 + Alg-15 combination
in the future.
Background Information:
1. I have a ‘hidden server’ acting as ‘The Signer’.
2. ‘The Signer’ feeds the already-signed zone to the visible ‘Primary
Server’.
3. The ‘Primary Server’, in turn, feeds all other ‘Secondary Servers’, some
of which are not under my control.
4. Unfortunately, currently none of the above servers is a Knot, but I am
switching The Signer to Knot.
My questions are:
5. What will be the correct configuration for The Knot Signer? I don’t mind
maintaining two completely separated ‘Signed Trees’ of the same zone,
unless cross-signing (the keys) between algorithms is the best practice.
6. Will there be any special configuration for the ‘Primary/Secondary
Servers’? If so, I will then need to inform admins of the servers outside
my control.
Thank you for any help you can offer, both on and off the mailing list.
Gratefully,
Pirawat.
--
_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ _/_/ Assist.Prof. Pirawat WATANAPONGSE,
Ph.D.
_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ _/_/ Department of Computer Engineering
_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ _/_/ Kasetsart University, Bangkhen (Main)
Campus
_/_/_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ Bangkok 10900, THAILAND
_/_/_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ eMail: Pirawat.W(a)ku.th or
Pirawat.W(a)ku.ac.th
_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ _/_/ Tel: +66 2 797 0999 extension 1417
_/_/ _/_/ _/_/_/_/_/_/ Fax: +66 2 579 6245
_/_/ _/_/ _/_/_/_/ http://www.cpe.ku.ac.th/~pw/
Hi all
My server recently gained two more IPv6 & IPv4 addresses. That broke my
transfer setup because for some reason knot is not using the address it is
binding to for the requests but some of the other ones.
Can I configure that?
Best,
Stefan
Hi knot-dns-users,
I have knotd as a slave for a dnsmasq and I'm seeing fallback from IXFR to
AXFR not working properly. TLDR: I have patches and while I'm waiting for
my gitlab access to be allowed to submit MRs I wrote this email :)
What happens is that the first AXFR goes through and everything looks happy
dandy, but if I restart dnsmasq to force a SOA update knot tries to do an
IXFR which fails and doesn't fall back to AXFR.
First the AXFR works:
knotd: info: [myzone.example.net.] AXFR, incoming, remote 2001:db8::2@53, started
knotd: [myzone.example.net.] AXFR, incoming, remote 2001:db8::2@53, finished, 0.00 seconds, 1 messages, 870 bytes
knotd: info: [myzone.example.net.] refresh, remote 2001:db8::2@53, zone updated, 0.00 seconds, serial none -> 1632501860
when I restart dnsmasq to force a SOA update, the following IXFR fails:
knotd: info: [myzone.example.net.] refresh, remote 2001:db8::2@53, remote serial 1632503553, zone is outdated
knotd: warning: [myzone.example.net.] IXFR, incoming, remote 2001:db8::2@53, malformed response SOA
knotd: warning: [myzone.example.net.] refresh, remote myremote-dnsmasq not usable
knotd: error: [myzone.example.net.] refresh, failed (no usable master)
I've been sitting on this bug for a while now since I couldn't make heads
or tails of what the code is doing but my third try at debugging this
finally worked out.
If we look at the fallback logic in src/knot/events/handlers/refresh.c, in
try_refresh(), it revolves around this kind of gnarly while statement:
// while loop runs 0x or 1x; IXFR to AXFR failover
while (ret = knot_requestor_exec(&requestor, req, timeout),
ret = (data.ret == KNOT_EOK ? ret : data.ret),
ixfr_error_failover(ret) && data.xfr_type == XFR_TYPE_IXFR &&
data.state != STATE_SOA_QUERY) {
If the while loop is taken fallback to AXFR happens otherwise not.
Attaching gdb to my running knot I can see that in my failure case all
conditionals except `data.xfr_type == _IXFR` are true but xfr_type is in
fact not _IXFR but _ERROR. As far as I can tell the only reason for this
check is to terminate the loop once the fallback to AXFR has happened as
`_AXFR != _IXFR`. I shall elaborate on this below.
So where does xfr_type become _ERROR? In my case determine_xfr_type()
returns _ERROR due to the first check, `answer->count < 1` and ixfr_consume
assigns this to xfr_type which in turn happens as part of the
knot_requestor_exec() call in the while.
So how does the fallback usually happen then? Well ixfr_consume checks the
RCODE and fails immediately, without modifying xfr_type that is, if it's no
good. That way the while statement will run the fallback code.
// Check RCODE
if (knot_pkt_ext_rcode(pkt) != KNOT_RCODE_NOERROR) {
[...]
return KNOT_STATE_FAIL;
}
I'm not really familliar with the DNS RFCs so I'm not sure if dnsmasq is
supposed to repond with an error to unsupported query types but from some
quick experiments against prominent authorative DNS servers around the
internet it does seem like it's behaviour, reponding with NOERROR, an empty
answer section and a SOA in authority is what everyone else does too when
they get an rrtype they don't care for.
Why now would the fallback logic not want to fallback to AXFR in this case?
I can't think of a reason it would really want to do that. Like I said
above it seems to me the only reason for the _IXFR check in the while is to
make sure the loop terminates. Though IMO this is a very roundabout way of
doing that and just using an if would be cleaner to boot.
Anyway, let's do some git archeology on that point. The first related
commit I can find is
commit 39e447e4590c7d5fc12a5c05ed11a45fd6561dda
Author: Libor Peltan <libcha.p(a)gmail.com>
Date: Wed Oct 17 10:08:53 2018 +0200
ixfr/axfr: failover even when the ixfr reply wasn't valid
before: ixfr falls back to axfr only if valid, but negative reply, e.g. NOTAUTH, journal inconsistency..
after: ixfr falls back to axfr in any case ixfr fails, e.g. malformed reply packet
This is the commit that introduced the while statement for the fallback in
try_refresh. It looked like so back then:
// while loop runs 0x or 1x; IXFR to AXFR failover
while ((ret = knot_requestor_exec(&requestor, req, timeout)) != KNOT_EOK &&
data.xfr_type == XFR_TYPE_IXFR) {
Much simpler, if knot_requestor_exec returns a failure and xfr_type is
_IXFR the fallback to AXFR happens. Now what I don't understand is that
from the commit message this fix sounds just like my issue. Dnsmasq sends
back what knot considers an invalid reply so why didn't this fix my problem
too? Weird.
Looking further I find
commit 5c1a5e28797f9c2eab1300247c052451ccd3be3e
Author: Libor Peltan <libor.peltan(a)nic.cz>
Date: Tue Jan 31 18:07:28 2017 +0100
XFR: proper handling of single-SOA first response message
which introduced determine_xfr_type and the XFR_TYPE_ERROR distinction. If
I build the commit just before that one
a8237b1f8 xfr: separated functions consuming one rrset of [ai]xfr response
and setup a config to reproduce my setup, then XFR against dnsmasq actually
starts to work. Back at 5c1a5e287 things are broken with the "malformed
SOA" message again. So we likely found the culprit.
Ok so back at the bad commit 5c1a5e287
// IXFR to AXFR failover
- if (data->is_ixfr && next == KNOT_STATE_FAIL) {
+ if (data->xfr_type == XFR_TYPE_IXFR && next == KNOT_STATE_FAIL) {
This is what introduced the `xfr_type == _IXFR` check which later got moved
from this if statement in transfer_consume() to the while loop in
try_refresh() by 39e447e45. The check used to be just for is_ixfr which got
initialized in refresh_begin to start with (in the good commit 5c1a5e287~1):
if (data->soa) {
data->state = STATE_SOA_QUERY;
data->is_ixfr = true;
} else {
in bad commit 5c1a5e287:
if (data->soa) {
data->state = STATE_SOA_QUERY;
data->xfr_type = XFR_TYPE_IXFR;
data->initial_soa_copy = NULL;
} else {
and then got reset to false by the fallback code.
So I'm pretty convinced at this point that 5c1a5e287 just messed up that
logic and the specificity of the XFR_TYPE_IXFR check really is unintended.
To fix this we simply replace that check with a counter that ensures the
loop will run at most twice like so:
--- a/src/knot/events/handlers/refresh.c
+++ b/src/knot/events/handlers/refresh.c
@@ -1188,12 +1188,12 @@ static int try_refresh(conf_t *conf, zone_t *zone, const conf_remote_t *master,
int timeout = conf->cache.srv_tcp_remote_io_timeout;
- int ret;
+ int ret, i;
// while loop runs 0x or 1x; IXFR to AXFR failover
while (ret = knot_requestor_exec(&requestor, req, timeout),
ret = (data.ret == KNOT_EOK ? ret : data.ret),
- ixfr_error_failover(ret) && data.xfr_type == XFR_TYPE_IXFR &&
+ ixfr_error_failover(ret) && i++ <= 1 &&
data.state != STATE_SOA_QUERY) {
REFRESH_LOG(LOG_WARNING, data.zone->name, data.remote,
"fallback to AXFR (%s)", knot_strerror(ret));
---
Thoughts? Am I missing something this check is doing?
--Daniel
Hi,
We're new in the dnssec field, and we hope we understand the basics,
also thanks to the much appreciated help received through this list and
through searching it's archives, thanks again!
We would like to ask two more short questions, but first a we will
explain how we currently understand things.
Our dns domain is sub.company.com, and we will activate DNSSEC somewhere
next week, by doing:
- enable dnssec for the zone / reverse zone in knot.conf
- restart knot
- display the generated dnssec keys, using:
> keymgr sub.company.com dnskey
> keymgr sub.company.com ds
(plus the reverse)
- send the outputs of the above to the admins at company.com
- after they have entered the keys in their dns, the world can check &
verify our dnssec, and things are operational.
- verify everything at https://dnssec-analyzer.verisignlabs.com/
Now the two questions.
We have set in knot.conf:
zsk-lifetime: 30d
ksk-lifetime: 365d
We understand that with the above config, monthly zsk key rollovers
happen automatically "inside" knot, but the yearly rollover (ksk) needs
to be manually propagated by us to the parent dns. (through for example
secured email to the admins at company.com)
Question one:
Is there some kind of notification mechanism in knot, that reminds us
(through email for example) that a ksk is about to expire, and keys need
to be renewed at company.com dns? I cannot find such a function. Does it
not exist? Or do we misunderstand something? It seems to be so vital.
Question two:
How unreasonable/insecure would it be to take a longer ksk lifetime than
one year, let's say 10 years. With the idea that we can always manually
renew keys earlier, in case we need to.
Feedback on the above is welcome. We have scheduled a maintenance moment
next week with the admins on company.com to send them the keys and
activate dnssec.
Thanks in advance for any feedback/pointers you can provide.
Best regards,
MJ
I notice that knot 3.1 does not support EdDSA (22519 and 448) when using
softhsm as a PKCS #11 backend. Since this is supported by knot when using
the default cryptographic provider, and also by gnutls 3.6.0 (at least for
the 25519 version) for release 3.6.0 and later, my guess is that this a
limitation in softhsm itself. Could anybody in this forum with the
necessary savvy please confirm (or not) this?
Hello List,
I would like to install KNOT-resolver, first test it with DNS over TLS, but
that doesn't work?
My system is an oracle Linux 8.4
I have a Letsencrypt certificate for this system and wanted to integrate it
into kresd, but I get a GNUTLS error?
Sep 22 18:27:30 bbs kresd[446005]: [tls ]
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(/etc/letsencrypt/live/bbs.xxxx.xxxx/
fullchain_ecdsa.pem,/etc/pki/private/xxxx.xxxx_ec.key) failed: -64
(GNUTLS_E_FILE_ERROR)
Sep 22 18:27:30 bbs kresd[446005]: [system] error while loading config: error
occurred here (config filename:lineno is at the bottom, if config is
involved):#012stack traceback:#012#011[C]: in function 'tls'#012#011/etc/knot-
resolver/kresd.conf:24: in main chunk#012ERROR: Invalid argument (workdir '/
var/lib/knot-resolver')
Sep 22 18:27:30 bbs systemd[1]: kresd(a)1.serbice.service: Main process exited,
code=exited, status=1/FAILURE
Does this not work with a Letsenkrypt certificate or I have another error in
my configuration
My config
-- SPDX-License-Identifier: CC0-1.0
-- vim:syntax=lua:set ts=4 sw=4:
-- Refer to manual: https://knot-resolver.readthedocs.org/en/stable/
-- Uncomment this only if you need to debug problems
-- verbose(true)
log_level('debug')
-- Network interface configuration
net.listen('127.0.0.1', 53, { kind = 'dns' })
net.listen('127.0.0.1', 853, { kind = 'tls' })
--net.listen('127.0.0.1', 443, { kind = 'doh2' })
net.listen('::1', 53, { kind = 'dns', freebind = true })
net.listen('::1', 853, { kind = 'tls', freebind = true })
--net.listen('::1', 443, { kind = 'doh2' })
net.listen('xxx.xxx.xxx.1', 53, { kind = 'dns' })
net.listen('xxx.xxx.xxx.1', 853, { kind = 'tls' })
net.listen('192.168.100.200', 53, { kind = 'dns' })
net.listen('192.168.100.200', 853, { kind = 'tls' })
net.listen('xxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxx::200', 53, { kind = 'dns' })
net.listen('xxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxx::200', 853, { kind = 'tls' })
-- DNS over TLS
net.tls("/etc/letsencrypt/live/bbs.xxxx.xxx/fullchain_ecdsa.pem", "/etc/pki/
tls/private/xxxx.xxx_ec.key")
-- Load useful modules
modules = {
'hints > iterate', -- Load /etc/hosts and allow custom root hints
'stats', -- Track internal statistics
'predict', -- Prefetch expiring/frequent records
}
The whole thing happens when I start kresd with "systemctl start kresd @ 1"?
when I start kresd -v on the command line I don't see any errors but I don't
know if he is using the "/etc/knot-resolver/kresd.conf"?
--
mit freundlichen Grüßen / best regards
Günther J. Niederwimmer
When Knot generates a key pair, it will save it in some directory in the
filesystem - in the clear, when using the default cryptographic provider,
or as an encrypted blob when using SoftHSM, or (possibly) a real HSM.
Imagine that I have a setup with many zones, with a signing policy that
causes them to be re-signed often - say, every hour or so. This implies
that new key pairs will be generated all the time.
My question is, how does Knot manage key pairs that it does not need any
more? It does not seem to remove them automatically. Does it provide any
mechanisms or tools to do so?
I have been looking into the key pre-generation capability of keymgr, and
the following question has come up:
Imagine I pre-generate, say, one month's worth of keys for a given zone.
This zone is defined so that it will be signed automatically on bringing up
the Knot server. Next I start the Knot server. What criteria are used in
order to select the keys, among the pre-generated ones, to be used to sign
this zone?
The reason I am asking is because I pre-generated two years worth of keys
for a particular zone, and when I started the Knot server it took a
significant amount of time selecting the appropriate keys from among the
pre-generated ones.
I am working on a Knot deployment that uses Nitrokey HSM[1] as a PKCS11 platform.
As you might imagine, for a small USB device, the Nitrokey is not exactly the most performant HSM in the world.
My configuration works great with one or two test zones. But when I start ramping up the number of zones, I start seeing weird problems with Knot (e.g. " blocked zone update due to open control transaction" errors ... which don't seem to be errors because my code debug shows the "zone-commit" being run, but it still leaves the Knot database in a weird corrupt state where I cannot even "conf-unset" a domain even if it is clearly existing in "conf-read").
Looking around the internet, it seems "OpenSC use_file_caching " might be the answer[2]. Does Knot support this ?
[1] https://www.nitrokey.com/files/doc/Nitrokey_HSM_factsheet.pdf
[2]https://support.nitrokey.com/t/slow-initialization-of-nitrokey-hsm/2906/6
Hello list,
I am a newbie
I have a problem with KNOT or I don't understand Knot?
What do I have to configure so that knot also dissolves my internal zones?
My config for the zones
# Internal zone
- domain: 4gjn.com.lan
# notify: secondary
file: "/var/lib/knot/zones/4gjn.com.lan.zone"
dnssec-signing: off
zonefile-sync: -1
zonefile-load: difference
journal-content: changes
# master: primary1
# acl: update_acl
# Master zone
- domain: 100.168.192.in-addr.arpa
# notify: secondary
file: "/var/lib/knot/zones/100.168.192.in-addr.arpa.zone"
zonefile-sync: -1
zonefile-load: difference
journal-content: changes
dnssec-signing: off
# master: primary
# acl: acl_secondary
with khost I have this answer on the knot-server
khost 192.168.100.204
204.100.168.192.in-addr.arpa. points to ipa.4gjn.com.lan.
khost ipa.4gjn.com.lan
ipa.4gjn.com.lan. has IPv4 address 192.168.100.204
But with host do I get the answer back?
host 192.168.100.204
Host 204.100.168.192.in-addr.arpa. not found: 3 (NXDOMAIN)
host ipa.4gjn.com.lan
Host ipa.4gjn.com.lan not found: 3 (NXDOMAIN)
is that correct or do I have an error?
ping seems to work
ping ipa.4gjn.com.lan
PING ipa.4gjn.com.lan (192.168.100.204) 56 (84) bytes of data.
Thanks for an answer,
--
mit freundlichen Grüßen / best regards
Günther J. Niederwimmer
Any ideas what might be causing the following error ?
knotc (Knot DNS), version 3.1.0
$ sudo /usr/sbin/knotc zone-backup -- +backupdir /home/foo/test
error: (operation not permitted)
The destination directory exits. It doesn't matter if I run the command as root or knot user, the error is the same.
According to the documentation, one can back up the KASP using the mdb_dump
command. Now I understand things correctly, this will just back up the
public component of key pairs, plus some metadata for the zones the public
keys are associated with.
Are there any provisions in Knot concerning the backing up of the private
components of key pairs, or is this something that must be done separately
and within the context of whatever cryptographic provider is used?
The documentation for keymgr describes the import-bind command as follows:
import-bind BIND_key_file
Imports a BIND-style key into KASP database (converting it to PEM format).
Takes one argument: path to BIND key file (private or public, but both MUST
exist).
What is imported into the KASP exactly? I thought that the KASP database
consisted of public keys alone. This aside, importing a private key will
depend on whether the cryptographic provider supports such an operation -
many HSMs, in particular those with stringent FIPS 140-compliance
requirements, will in general refuse to do so.
So, what does this command do with the private key? Is it turned over to
the cryptographic provider, returning an error if this provider refuses to
import private keys? If such is the case, is the public key still imported
into the KASP, even though there will be no matching private key for it
anywhere in the system?
One can of course use a public key without a matching private key, but in a
DNSSEC software framework like Knot, where the bulk of the activity
consists of carrying out signing operations, the presence of a complete key
pair would seem to be essential.
Hi,
For various reasons I need to write a Go wrapper around knotc conf.
The problem is I am seeing weird behaviour (the below is stdout from my Go script):
########
Command being run: /usr/sbin/knotc conf-begin
OK
Command being run: /usr/sbin/knotc conf-set 'server.version' '299'error: (invalid item) 'server.version' = '299'
Command being run: /usr/sbin/knotc conf-abortOK
########
If I take the "usr/sbin/knotc conf-set 'server.version' '299'" string generated by Go and paste it onto CLI, it returns OK ?
I have tried adding "-v" flag but that does not produce any interesting output.
Any idea where I might be going wrong here ? Why am I getting "error: (invalid item)" when Go executes the command, but not when I run it manually ?
Thanks !
Tha man page for keymgr says that the keymgr generate command
(quote) Generates new DNSSEC key and stores it in KASP database. (unquote)
What is exactly stored in the KASP database?
The reason I am asking is because the actual cryptographic key will be
available in the clear only when using the default key store. When using an
HSM (or event softhsm) only the HSM will have access to the key in the
clear. So, what is it that gets stored in the KASP database when an HSM is
used for generating keys?
Hi,
We are testing migration from bind to knot, to implement dnssec. We like
many things about knot! Thank you for making it available!
So far many things work, but we do have some uncertainties. Hope they're
not too basic to ask here...
We are using ubuntu, knot 3.1.0, our static bind zone files saved as
/var/lib/knot/zones/db.domain.com and also the non-binary knot config.
(in /etc/knot/knot.conf)
1) I wanted to test the knotc zone-backup command, but we're getting:
> error: backup init failed (operation not permitted)
Is the zone-backup command geared towards binary zones? Are our static
zone files the reason this doesn't work? I realise we can simply copy
the zone files, so in our case, the backup command probably adds nothing.
2) I have enabled DNSSEC, and upon restart we saw the keys being
generated, and files appeared under /var/lib/knot/keys
I guess keeping copies of the files there is adequate backup too? No
"knotc zone-backup" required here as well?
3) After each knot restart, we are seeing:
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: info: [1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa.] DNSSEC, zone is up-to-date
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: info: [1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa.] loaded, serial none -> 2017041004, 106139 bytes
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: info: [1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2021-08-09T16:10:10+0200
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: info: [domain.com.] DNSSEC, zone is up-to-date
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: info: [domain.com.] loaded, serial none -> 2021072903, 183151 bytes
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: info: [domain.com.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2021-08-09T16:10:10+0200
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: warning: [domain.com.] failed to update zone file (operation not permitted)
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: error: [domain.com.] zone event 'journal flush' failed (operation not permitted)
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: warning: [1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa.] failed to update zone file (operation not permitted)
> Aug 2 16:44:56 Latitude-E7470 knotd[259063]: error: [1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa.] zone event 'journal flush' failed (operation not permitted)
We would like to understand the warnings/errors here too. Why would knot
try to update the zone files, and why it is failing? I have set the
permissions on the zone files 660 / knot:knot so it should be able edit
them. (but again: why would knot want to update them?)
Thanks for any feedback!
MJ
Hi all
I am currently running these two policies:
```
policy:
- id: edecc
algorithm: ed25519
nsec3: on
- id: rsa
algorithm: RSASHA256
ksk-size: 2048
zsk-size: 2048
nsec3: on
```
I tried enabling both with this command, but to no effect:
```
dnssec-policy: [ edecc, rsa ]
```
Is there a way to do both at the same time in one zone?
I am currently running knot 3.0.8
Cheers,
Stefan
Hi,
i'm trying to setup a knot dns server for my personal domain.
The servers are running and synchronizing between master and slave, but
i cannot figure out why they do not get accepted by my domain hoster.
I do get a 'Parameter value range error' response from them, so i figure
it may be my configuration which is not right.
I'm no pro in this stuff but i'm curious how it works, so if you don't
mind i'll post it here and maybe someone has a thought what could be
going on. Or maybe has some additional test i can run.
I also checked them with nast from denic:
https://www.denic.de/en/service/tools/nast/ (Nameserver Predelegation Check)
Which doesn't complain, if i enter ns1.mydomain.de/ns2.domain.de and
ipv4 / ipv6 ip's and click 'execute check'.
I also checked with dig for response:
dig @ns1.mydomain.de mydomain.de soa
;; BADCOOKIE, retrying.
; <<>> DiG 9.16.18 <<>> @ns1.mydomain.de mydomain.de soa
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 1174
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232
; COOKIE: 270b9518832d67270100000060d6d65c1844d3479cc64453 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;mydomain.de. IN SOA
;; ANSWER SECTION:
mydomain.de. 86400 IN SOA ns1.mydomain.de.
dnsadmin.mydomain.de. 2021062526 14400 1800 2419200 900
;; Query time: 63 msec
;; SERVER: aa.bb.cc.dd.ee#53(aa.bb.cc.dd)
;; WHEN: Sa Jun 26 09:25:16 CEST 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 119
and here is my config:
server:
identity: ns1.mydomain.de
nsid: ns1.mydomain.de
rundir: "/run/knot"
user: knot:knot
listen: [ aa.bb.cc.dd.ee@53, aa:bb:cc:dd@53 ]
mod-rrl:
- id: default
rate-limit: 200
slip: 2
log:
- target: syslog
any: info
policy:
- id: rsa2k
algorithm: RSASHA256
ksk-size: 4096
zsk-size: 2048
nsec3: on
- id: ececc
algorithm: ecdsap384sha384
nsec3: on
template:
- id: default
storage: "/var/lib/knot"
dnssec-signing: on
dnssec-policy: rsa2k
global-module: mod-cookies
global-module: mod-rrl/default
database:
storage: "/var/lib/knot"
key:
- id: dnsmaster
algorithm: hmac-sha512
secret: secret
- id: dnsslave
algorithm: hmac-sha512
secret: secret
remote:
- id: secondary
address: ee.ff.gg.hh@53
key: dnsslave
acl:
- id: acl_secondary
address: ee.ff.gg.hh
key: dnsmaster
action: transfer
zone:
- domain: mydomain.de
file: "/etc/knot/zones/mydomain.de.zone"
notify: secondary
acl: acl_secondary
zonefile-load: difference
and my zone file (without the keys and stuff added from knotd):
;; Zone dump (Knot DNS 3.0.7)
mydomain.de. 86400 SOA ns1.mydomain.de.
dnsadmin.mydomain.de. 2021062526 14400 1800 2419200 900
mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
mydomain.de. 86400 TXT "v=spf1 ip4:aa.bb.cc.dd -all"
mydomain.de. 86400 NS ns1.mydomain.de.
mydomain.de. 86400 NS ns2.mydomain.de.
mydomain.de. 86400 MX 10 mail.mydomain.de.
_dmarc.mydomain.de. 86400 TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject;
rua=mailto:postmaster@mydomain.de; pct=100; fo=0:d:s; aspf=r; adkim=r;"
_token._dnswl.mydomain.de. 86400 TXT "somestuff"
2020._domainkey.mydomain.de. 86400 TXT "v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=alongline"
_mta-sts.mydomain.de. 86400 TXT "v=STSv1; id=20210519103000Z;"
_smtp._tls.mydomain.de. 86400 TXT "v=TLSRPTv1;
rua=mailto:postmaster@mydomain.de"
autoconfig.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
autoconfig.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
test.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA ee:ff:gg:hh
test.mydomain.de. 86400 A ee.ff.gg.hh
imap.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
imap.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
mail.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
mail.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
mta-sts.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
mta-sts.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
ns1.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
ns1.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
ns2.mydomain.de. 86400 A ee.ff.gg.hh
ns2.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA ee:ff:gg:hh
smtp.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
smtp.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
wiki.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
wiki.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
www.mydomain.de. 86400 AAAA aa:bb:cc:dd
www.mydomain.de. 86400 A aa.bb.cc.dd
thanks for listening!
juergen
Hello List,
I like to change to knot but ..........;-)
Can any help Please?
1.
My config is working with the Master Domains but I have a problem to configure
to allow update "AXFER" TO my SLAVE servers ?
What is the way to allow this.
2.
I have a internal zone "examle.com.lan" this is loading, but I have to
configure a PTR Zone this is not working, have any a example to configure this
out.
also a in-addr-arpa zonen?
3.
the same Problem I have with ip6-arpa, what is the way to configure my hurican
Net reverse zone
with my old server bind this is all working, but I like to change :-)
for all Help / answers all thanks
--
mit freundlichen Grüßen / best regards
Günther J. Niederwimmer
Thanks. You are right - once the keymgr operation is launched on a zone that is defined in knot.conf so that the SoftHSM policy applies to it, the keys involved are managed by the softhsm module. I have verified that such is the case for keymgr when using the generate command, and it stands to reason that the same would apply to other commands supported by keymgr. I haven't tried modifying the template section, as you suggest, but I am sure it works as expected. This all also explains and justifies why an option to specify a keystore for keymgr to work with, present in older versions, has been removed - it is not necessary.
Thanks for your help/
-----Original Message-----
From: "Daniel Salzman" [daniel.salzman(a)nic.cz]
Date: 05/03/2021 01:57 AM
To: "Full Name" <nuncestbibendum(a)excite.com>, knot-dns-users(a)lists.nic.cz
Subject: Re: [knot-dns-users] keymgr and keystores
If you don't specify any configuration or kaspdb explicitly, keymgr uses default Knot configuration (file or database).
So the problem probably is that you are generating keys for zones with default dnssec policy, which doesn't use the softhsm keystore.
Try setting:
template:
- id: default
...
dnssec-policy: RSAPol
On 5/2/21 3:46 PM, Full Name wrote:
> Thanks for your reply. Please see my comments below.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: "Daniel Salzman" [daniel.salzman(a)nic.cz]
> Date: 05/02/2021 04:51 AM
> To: knot-dns-users(a)lists.nic.cz
> Subject: Re: [knot-dns-users] keymgr and keystores
>
>
> On 4/30/21 7:47 PM, Full Name wrote:
>> I am evaluating version 2.9.5 of Knot, in particular in what concerns key management. This examination has resulted in the following issues/questions, which I would like to bring up to this forum for discussion/clarification:
>>
>> 1. I have been testing with the default Knot out-of-the-box setup, with the following knot.conf file:
>>
>> server:
>> listen: [10.0.0.1 ]
>>
>> log:
>> - target: syslog
>> any: info
>>
>> template:
>> - id: default
>> global-module: mod-stats
>>
>> mod-stats:
>> - id: default
>>
>> policy:
>> - id: RSAPol
>> algorithm: RSASHA256
>> ksk-size: 2048
>> zsk-size: 1024
>>
>> zone:
>> - domain: s0.mydomain.com
>> storage: /var/lib/MyZones/db
>> file: db.s0
>> dnssec-signing: on
>> dnssec-policy: RSAPol
>>
>> On launching Knot, this works as expected:
>>
>> - The necessary key pairs are generated and stored in /var/lib/knot/keys in the clear, with files data.db and lock.db created in /var/lib/knot.
>> - The appropriate zone is signed, with the file containing the signed data under /var/lib/MyZones/db.
>>
>> 2. I next tried with SoftHSM for the low-level cryptographic support. The knot.conf file is the same as above, with the following changes:
>>
>> - I added a keystore section:
>>
>> keystore:
>> - id: SoftHSM
>> backend: pkcs11
>> config: "pkcs11:token=KNOT;pin-value=112233 libsofthsm2.so"
>>
>> - I modified the zone section to use SoftHSM:
>
> [DS] I expect you modified the policy section!
>
> Yes, I added a line
>
> keystore: SoftHSM
>
> I.e. the policy section reads
>
> policy:
> - id: RSAPol
> algorithm: RSASHA256
> ksk-size: 2048
> zsk-size: 1024
> keystore: SoftHSM
>
> I should have pointed this out explicitly - my mistake.
>
>
>>
>> zone:
>> - domain: s0.mydomain.com
>> storage: /var/lib/MyZones/db
>> file: db.s0
>> dnssec-signing: on
>> dnssec-policy: RSAPol
>> keystore: SoftHMS
>>
>
> Notice it should read keystore: SoftHSM. This is just a transcription error on my side - it is correct in the actual knot.conf file that I am using.
>
>> Before proceeding, I removed everything from /var/lib/knot. On launching knot again, this is what happens:
>>
>> - data.db and lock.db are created under /var/lib/knot, but no key pairs are created under /var/lib/knot/keys.
>> - Key pairs are created under /var/lib/softhsm/tokens/adf76cd6-5411-843e-6036-b8523580ef94.
>> - The appropriate zone is signed, with the file containing the signed data under /var/lib/MyZones/db.
>>
>> This is all pretty much as expected, in that the signing keys have been generated in the space set aside by SoftHSM, and the signatures have been computed by the SoftHSM module.
>>
>> Now what I was wondering is whether keymgr can be used to manage keys in SofHSM? By default, it would seem to be the case that whenever I generate a key pair with keymgr, the key pair is stored under /var/lib/knot/keys, in the clear. Nothing seems to change under /var/lib/softhsm/tokens as a result of such a keymgr command. This is the case no matter what version of the knot.conf files described above I use.
>
> [DS] What are your parameters to keymgr? Don't you use default configuration (-d parameter)?
>
> No parameters. I just invoke it as
>
> keymgr mydomain.com. generate algorithm=RSASHA256
>
> Specifying -d /tmp will create db files under /tmp, and a keys directory under /tmp containing the actual keys in the clear. The essence of the issue remains the same though: the private keys are in the clear, and don't seem to have been generated by SoftHSM.
>
>
>> Here is my question:
>>
>> Is keymgr capable of managing keys in some separate device - SoftHSM, or a real, hardware HSM - or is it limited to keys generated by the default mechanism, with no HSM?
>
> [DS] Keymgr follows the zone's policy. So it uses the keystore which is configured for the zone.
>
> That's what I thought. Here's the thing though: in the knot.conf file above I changed the config entry in the keystore section, so that the wrong user PIN is supplied when attempting to access the services of the SoftHSM module. However, when using the keymgr command above, key pairs are are still generated without error, and stored outside the disk area allocated for SoftHSM. This makes me think that SoftHSM is not being used for this operation. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that when I launch knot with that incorrect PIN in knot.conf, signatures are not computed and I get errors in syslog to that effect.
>
> The bottom line is that, although key pairs are definitely created by SoftHSM, and stored in the disk area for SoftHSM, when the automatic key generation process, as driven by knot.conf, kicks in, when using keymgr I have yet to be able to get SoftHSM to generate key pairs and store them in its disk area. What am I doing wrong?
>
>
>
>>
>> I notice that in previous versions of Knot, the keymgr utility supported options to use different keystores. Such options seem to be gone from keymgr as distributed with Knot 2.9.5. Can anybody elaborate on why they were removed, and whether some other utility is provided to achieve the same goals?
>>
>> Ultimately, what I am interested in is to have all of my keys so that they are available to the HSM alone, and I want to find out what tools does Knot provide - if any - to manage those keys, bearing in mind that they will have to be protected in permanent storage until such time that they are meant to be loaded into the HSM to be used. This is crucial, for most HSMs won't keep any keys across power cycles, and even when they do, they number that they can keep will in general be too small for my needs.
>>
>>
>>
>>
Thanks for your reply. Please see my comments below.
-----Original Message-----
From: "Daniel Salzman" [daniel.salzman(a)nic.cz]
Date: 05/02/2021 04:51 AM
To: knot-dns-users(a)lists.nic.cz
Subject: Re: [knot-dns-users] keymgr and keystores
On 4/30/21 7:47 PM, Full Name wrote:
> I am evaluating version 2.9.5 of Knot, in particular in what concerns key management. This examination has resulted in the following issues/questions, which I would like to bring up to this forum for discussion/clarification:
>
> 1. I have been testing with the default Knot out-of-the-box setup, with the following knot.conf file:
>
> server:
> listen: [10.0.0.1 ]
>
> log:
> - target: syslog
> any: info
>
> template:
> - id: default
> global-module: mod-stats
>
> mod-stats:
> - id: default
>
> policy:
> - id: RSAPol
> algorithm: RSASHA256
> ksk-size: 2048
> zsk-size: 1024
>
> zone:
> - domain: s0.mydomain.com
> storage: /var/lib/MyZones/db
> file: db.s0
> dnssec-signing: on
> dnssec-policy: RSAPol
>
> On launching Knot, this works as expected:
>
> - The necessary key pairs are generated and stored in /var/lib/knot/keys in the clear, with files data.db and lock.db created in /var/lib/knot.
> - The appropriate zone is signed, with the file containing the signed data under /var/lib/MyZones/db.
>
> 2. I next tried with SoftHSM for the low-level cryptographic support. The knot.conf file is the same as above, with the following changes:
>
> - I added a keystore section:
>
> keystore:
> - id: SoftHSM
> backend: pkcs11
> config: "pkcs11:token=KNOT;pin-value=112233 libsofthsm2.so"
>
> - I modified the zone section to use SoftHSM:
[DS] I expect you modified the policy section!
Yes, I added a line
keystore: SoftHSM
I.e. the policy section reads
policy:
- id: RSAPol
algorithm: RSASHA256
ksk-size: 2048
zsk-size: 1024
keystore: SoftHSM
I should have pointed this out explicitly - my mistake.
>
> zone:
> - domain: s0.mydomain.com
> storage: /var/lib/MyZones/db
> file: db.s0
> dnssec-signing: on
> dnssec-policy: RSAPol
> keystore: SoftHMS
>
Notice it should read keystore: SoftHSM. This is just a transcription error on my side - it is correct in the actual knot.conf file that I am using.
> Before proceeding, I removed everything from /var/lib/knot. On launching knot again, this is what happens:
>
> - data.db and lock.db are created under /var/lib/knot, but no key pairs are created under /var/lib/knot/keys.
> - Key pairs are created under /var/lib/softhsm/tokens/adf76cd6-5411-843e-6036-b8523580ef94.
> - The appropriate zone is signed, with the file containing the signed data under /var/lib/MyZones/db.
>
> This is all pretty much as expected, in that the signing keys have been generated in the space set aside by SoftHSM, and the signatures have been computed by the SoftHSM module.
>
> Now what I was wondering is whether keymgr can be used to manage keys in SofHSM? By default, it would seem to be the case that whenever I generate a key pair with keymgr, the key pair is stored under /var/lib/knot/keys, in the clear. Nothing seems to change under /var/lib/softhsm/tokens as a result of such a keymgr command. This is the case no matter what version of the knot.conf files described above I use.
[DS] What are your parameters to keymgr? Don't you use default configuration (-d parameter)?
No parameters. I just invoke it as
keymgr mydomain.com. generate algorithm=RSASHA256
Specifying -d /tmp will create db files under /tmp, and a keys directory under /tmp containing the actual keys in the clear. The essence of the issue remains the same though: the private keys are in the clear, and don't seem to have been generated by SoftHSM.
> Here is my question:
>
> Is keymgr capable of managing keys in some separate device - SoftHSM, or a real, hardware HSM - or is it limited to keys generated by the default mechanism, with no HSM?
[DS] Keymgr follows the zone's policy. So it uses the keystore which is configured for the zone.
That's what I thought. Here's the thing though: in the knot.conf file above I changed the config entry in the keystore section, so that the wrong user PIN is supplied when attempting to access the services of the SoftHSM module. However, when using the keymgr command above, key pairs are are still generated without error, and stored outside the disk area allocated for SoftHSM. This makes me think that SoftHSM is not being used for this operation. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that when I launch knot with that incorrect PIN in knot.conf, signatures are not computed and I get errors in syslog to that effect.
The bottom line is that, although key pairs are definitely created by SoftHSM, and stored in the disk area for SoftHSM, when the automatic key generation process, as driven by knot.conf, kicks in, when using keymgr I have yet to be able to get SoftHSM to generate key pairs and store them in its disk area. What am I doing wrong?
>
> I notice that in previous versions of Knot, the keymgr utility supported options to use different keystores. Such options seem to be gone from keymgr as distributed with Knot 2.9.5. Can anybody elaborate on why they were removed, and whether some other utility is provided to achieve the same goals?
>
> Ultimately, what I am interested in is to have all of my keys so that they are available to the HSM alone, and I want to find out what tools does Knot provide - if any - to manage those keys, bearing in mind that they will have to be protected in permanent storage until such time that they are meant to be loaded into the HSM to be used. This is crucial, for most HSMs won't keep any keys across power cycles, and even when they do, they number that they can keep will in general be too small for my needs.
>
>
>
>
--
https://lists.nic.cz/mailman/listinfo/knot-dns-user
I am evaluating version 2.9.5 of Knot, in particular in what concerns key management. This examination has resulted in the following issues/questions, which I would like to bring up to this forum for discussion/clarification:
1. I have been testing with the default Knot out-of-the-box setup, with the following knot.conf file:
server:
listen: [10.0.0.1 ]
log:
- target: syslog
any: info
template:
- id: default
global-module: mod-stats
mod-stats:
- id: default
policy:
- id: RSAPol
algorithm: RSASHA256
ksk-size: 2048
zsk-size: 1024
zone:
- domain: s0.mydomain.com
storage: /var/lib/MyZones/db
file: db.s0
dnssec-signing: on
dnssec-policy: RSAPol
On launching Knot, this works as expected:
- The necessary key pairs are generated and stored in /var/lib/knot/keys in the clear, with files data.db and lock.db created in /var/lib/knot.
- The appropriate zone is signed, with the file containing the signed data under /var/lib/MyZones/db.
2. I next tried with SoftHSM for the low-level cryptographic support. The knot.conf file is the same as above, with the following changes:
- I added a keystore section:
keystore:
- id: SoftHSM
backend: pkcs11
config: "pkcs11:token=KNOT;pin-value=112233 libsofthsm2.so"
- I modified the zone section to use SoftHSM:
zone:
- domain: s0.mydomain.com
storage: /var/lib/MyZones/db
file: db.s0
dnssec-signing: on
dnssec-policy: RSAPol
keystore: SoftHMS
Before proceeding, I removed everything from /var/lib/knot. On launching knot again, this is what happens:
- data.db and lock.db are created under /var/lib/knot, but no key pairs are created under /var/lib/knot/keys.
- Key pairs are created under /var/lib/softhsm/tokens/adf76cd6-5411-843e-6036-b8523580ef94.
- The appropriate zone is signed, with the file containing the signed data under /var/lib/MyZones/db.
This is all pretty much as expected, in that the signing keys have been generated in the space set aside by SoftHSM, and the signatures have been computed by the SoftHSM module.
Now what I was wondering is whether keymgr can be used to manage keys in SofHSM? By default, it would seem to be the case that whenever I generate a key pair with keymgr, the key pair is stored under /var/lib/knot/keys, in the clear. Nothing seems to change under /var/lib/softhsm/tokens as a result of such a keymgr command. This is the case no matter what version of the knot.conf files described above I use.
Here is my question:
Is keymgr capable of managing keys in some separate device - SoftHSM, or a real, hardware HSM - or is it limited to keys generated by the default mechanism, with no HSM?
I notice that in previous versions of Knot, the keymgr utility supported options to use different keystores. Such options seem to be gone from keymgr as distributed with Knot 2.9.5. Can anybody elaborate on why they were removed, and whether some other utility is provided to achieve the same goals?
Ultimately, what I am interested in is to have all of my keys so that they are available to the HSM alone, and I want to find out what tools does Knot provide - if any - to manage those keys, bearing in mind that they will have to be protected in permanent storage until such time that they are meant to be loaded into the HSM to be used. This is crucial, for most HSMs won't keep any keys across power cycles, and even when they do, they number that they can keep will in general be too small for my needs.
Hi Chris,
first of all, you seem to be talking about Knot DNS, so it's proper to
switch to correct mailing list, instead of Knot Resolver's one.
I assume you have read all the single-version migration guides below
https://www.knot-dns.cz/docs/3.0/singlehtml/index.html#upgrade-2-6-x-to-2-7…
. It's clear that when migrating over multiple versions, you need to
take care about all the notes at once.
What databases exactly are you talking about? Knot DNS uses multiple
databases for different purposes, e.g. journal or KASP DB. The good news
is, their format does not change much, and when it does, it's usually
backwards-compatible, with some exceptions.
I would strongly recommend that you clone your environment, perform the
migration in some "playground" setup first, and observe if everything
went well; all before migration your production setup ;) Should you
encounter any issues, please contact us on our mailing-list.
Anyway, you might consider a multi-step migration, so that you would
migrate by just one (major) version at once, like this: 2.6.5 -> 2.7.8
-> 2.8.5 -> 2.9.9 -> 3.0.5.
Thanks!
Libor
Dne 09. 04. 21 v 8:13 Daniel Salzman napsal(a):
>
>
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: [knot-resolver-users] Any "gothcas" going from 2.65 to 3.04 I should know about?
> Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2021 23:03:54 -0700
> From: Chris <knot(a)tacomawireless.net>
> Reply-To: Knot Resolver Users List <knot-resolver-users(a)lists.nic.cz>
> To: knot-resolver-users <knot-resolver-users(a)lists.nic.cz>
>
> Hi. Moving a couple of our servers to new hardware, and
> taking that opportunity to upgrade some of the services
> at the same time. The main one being knot. Moving from
> a 2.65 context to 3.04. I've read the upgrade doc, and
> while there isn't a 2.65 --> 3.04. It appears for our
> environment that the changed/removed stanzas won't
> have much of an impact *except* as they relate to the
> database. That is; it appears that it isn't going to
> be a smooth transition, as they appear to be incompatible.
> Is that right? Do I need to rewrite all the keys &&
> serials, and start from scratch? If so, as we have
> a huge number of domains, this will be an enormous task.
> Is this avoidable?
>
> Thank you for any and all insight into this transition.
>
> --Chris
Is there a way to configure Knot to avoid overwriting a zone file when
it's doing automatic signing?
I was hoping some combination of zonefile-load and journal-content
would tell Knot to store its internally managed data in the journal
instead of in the zone file, but I haven't found that combination. I
don't see any other likely candidates in the config options, but
hoping I've missed something...
Good afternoon,
in preparation for Knot 3.1, I wanted to update our template that uses
zonefile-load: difference-no-serial from journal-content: changes to
journal-content: all.
However, it seems that we somehow have to update the existing journal.
Otherwise it seems the first change to a zone after that change, will
lead to the following error (running knot 3.0.4):
error: [example.net.] zone event 'load' failed (semantic check)
Subsequent changes seem to be applied just fine.
What is the proposed strategy to change this setting?
Regards
André
Hi,
we performed successfully an algorithm rollover. After changing the
algorithm in the configuration file everything worked as expected. All
zones have been updated to the new algorithm.
When I now sign a new zone the zone is being signed with the old
algorithm's key and an algorithm rollover is being triggered immediately.
Is this an expected behavior? How can I avoid this? Do I have to delete
the old key?
Thanks a lot,
Thomas
Hi!
I have two Debian 10 Buster systems, both patched up current, and both
running Knot 3.0.4-1~cz.nic~buster1 from the apt repository at
https://deb.knot-dns.cz/knot-latest/.
Both Knot installations have virtually identical configs .. really
only different in the related hosts and zone lists. Their logging
configs are both:
log:
- target: syslog
any: info
One of these Knot instances logs to syslog, and the other logs to
systemd-journald. I'm trying to figure out why the difference, and
I've come up empty. The Knot docs simply say that if Knot is compiled
against systemd, then a 'syslog' setting will use systemd-journald.
Mostly I want to know so that I can convince the one using journald to
stop doing that. :) What other things might trigger Knot to use
syslog on a systemd-managed host?
Hi,
is it possible to have two different DNSSEC policies in place? For
example having one domain singed with Alg 8 and another one with Alg 13?
Thanks a lot,
Thomas
Hi!
Today we tried to do a dynamic update to the dnskey set.
What we want to do is to import the ZSK from another signer.
Didn’t work so well.
Feb 16 17:15:28 ip-172-31-38-41 knotd[24222]: warning: DDNS, refusing to update DNSSEC-related record
I guess knot doesn’t like dynamic DNSSEC updates.
I even tried with policy manual:on.
What does one have to do to be allowed to add (or delete) DNSKEY records?
/Ulrich
Hello all, I am attempting to test freezing a zone, and something appears not to be working (that something could be my understanding of how it is supposed to work).
Using a very simple example.com zone (the default that ships with v3.0.4), I am able to query for "mail.example.com" and get the correct response back. I then query for "test.example.com" and get an NXDOMAIN, as expected. Then I do the following:
$ sudo knotc zone-freeze example.com
OK
$
Doing a zone-status, I see:
$ sudo knotc zone-status example.com
[example.com.] role: master | serial: 2010111219 | transaction: none | freeze: yes | expiration: not scheduled | notify: not scheduled
$ sudo knotc zone-begin example.com
OK
$ sudo knotc zone-set example.com test 3600 A 150.150.150.150
OK
$ sudo knotc zone-commit example.com
OK
$ sudo knotc zone-flush example.com
OK
$
After the zone-flush, I am able to query for "test.example.com" and I get back the A-record with address 150.150.150.150. I would have thought that with the zone frozen, the zone-flush would not go through and the A-record for "test" would not be added.
Am I missing something obvious, or does zone-freeze just not work in version 3.0.4?
Thanks in advance,
~J
Hello,
I have just run into a weird problem and since I have failed to look
this up on the Web myself, I wonder if anyone here could give me a
pointer regarding what to do with it.
I run a Linux/arm DNS server based on knot-3.0.4. It used to serve as a
slave in a zone whose master was a knot-2.9, with automatic DNSSEC
signing _on master only_ set up and working. The zone configuration
(minus "master" and "acl" keywords) looked as follows:
zonefile-load: difference-no-serial
journal-content: all
semantic-checks: on
# dnssec-signing: on
# dnssec-policy: nsec3
where "nsec3" is a policy also defined in Knot configuration, identical
to the one used on the master. In this role everything worked fine.
Recently it has been decided to retire the original master server and
replace it with the erstwhile slave. I removed the "master" line from
the zone configuration in knot.conf (yes, I did leave the DNSSEC line
commented out) in addition to setting up replication to a new slave
server, copied the key files + the KASP dump from the old master and
installed them in the right places, then restarted knot. Again, so far
so good.
I then attempted to re-enable DNSSEC by uncommenting those two lines -
and immediately after I'd run 'knotc reload' Knot began spamming the
system log with lines like
info: [example.com.] zone file parsed, serial corrected 2021020301 ->
2021020303
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, key, tag 4533, algorithm
RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1, KSK, public, active
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, key, tag 10532, algorithm
RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1, public, active
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, signing started
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, successfully signed
info: [example.com.] loaded, serial 2021020302 -> 2021020303 ->
2021020302, 113233 bytes
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2021-02-10T13:21:14+0000
info: [example.com.] zone file parsed, serial corrected 2021020301 ->
2021020303
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, key, tag 4533, algorithm
RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1, KSK, public, active
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, key, tag 10532, algorithm
RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1, public, active
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, signing started
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, successfully signed
info: [example.com.] loaded, serial 2021020302 -> 2021020303 ->
2021020302, 113233 bytes
info: [example.com.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2021-02-10T13:21:14+0000
info: [example.com.] zone file parsed, serial corrected 2021020301 ->
2021020303
[...and so on...]
This was accompanied by knot consistently requiring much more CPU power
than usual. I also noticed that unlike before, running 'knotc
zone-flush' or shutting Knot down does NOT update the plain-text zone files.
From what I could see by removing old DNSSEC signatures and the NSEC3
chain from the zone file, restarting Knot and then querying the server
with dig, the server does indeed sign the zone. Therefore, my current
working hypothesis is that somehow Knot does not update its internal
zone state following the successful signing, thus continuing to think
the outdated zone file found on the file system is the latest available
version. The problem is, I do not know why it does it or how I could
make it stop.
Any and all suggestions will be very much appreciated!
Cheers,
--
MS
Hi all,
I can't quite figure this out, I have two servers running Knot DNS 3.0.3 on Ubuntu 20.04.
horus.bastetrix.net is the primary, sekhmet.bastetrix.net is the secondary.
One of the zones hosted on these servers is selfhosting.cloud.
Whenever I commit a change to selfhosting.cloud, this happens in the log. As you can see, for some reason the IPv4 address returns a NOTAUTH error and then Knot successfully notifies over IPv6.
Dec 27 00:53:37 horus.bastetrix.net knotd[174159]: warning: [selfhosting.cloud.] notify, outgoing, remote 192.195.251.53@53, server responded with error 'NOTAUTH'
Dec 27 00:53:37 horus.bastetrix.net knotd[174159]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] notify, outgoing, remote 2620:98:400c::53@53, serial 5
Dec 27 00:53:38 horus.bastetrix.net knotd[174159]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] IXFR, outgoing, remote 2620:98:400c::53@36778, started, serial 4 -> 5
Dec 27 00:53:38 horus.bastetrix.net knotd[174159]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] IXFR, outgoing, remote 2620:98:400c::53@36778, finished, 0.00 seconds, 1 messages, 295 bytes
sekhmet only logs a successful notify and IXFR from the v6 address, nothing about the failed v4 notify:
Dec 27 00:53:37 sekhmet.bastetrix.net knotd[536887]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] notify, incoming, remote 2620:98:400a::53@58782, serial 5
Dec 27 00:53:38 sekhmet.bastetrix.net knotd[536887]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] refresh, remote 2620:98:400a::53@53, remote serial 5, zone is outdated
Dec 27 00:53:38 sekhmet.bastetrix.net knotd[536887]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] IXFR, incoming, remote 2620:98:400a::53@53, started
Dec 27 00:53:38 sekhmet.bastetrix.net knotd[536887]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] IXFR, incoming, remote 2620:98:400a::53@53, finished, 0.00 seconds, 1 messages, 295 bytes
Dec 27 00:53:38 sekhmet.bastetrix.net knotd[536887]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] refresh, remote 2620:98:400a::53@53, zone updated, 0.40 seconds, serial 4 -> 5
Dec 27 00:53:38 sekhmet.bastetrix.net knotd[536887]: info: [selfhosting.cloud.] zone file updated, serial 4 -> 5
I am attaching the knot.conf for both servers. I double checked both configs multiple times and don't see why that particular warning is happening during zone notify.
Can someone shed some light on this mystery?
--
Sadiq Saif
https://bastetrix.com
Hi,
We're migrating our signer from OpenDNSSEC to Knot 3.0. Our new design
will have one active signer and at least one backup signer. Zone data is
deployed from git to both signers. We've got syncing of the keys working
using `knotc zone-backup +nozonefile` and `knotc zone-restore
+nozonefile`. I'm still unsure of how hot to keep the standby. In the
dev env now I have the standby set to a manual dnssec policy to keep it
from rolling it's keys. The keys are synced from the active signer every
hour. Both the active and the backup signers are creating signatures but
SOA serials don't match. Both signers have `serial-policy: dateserial`
and `zonefile-sync: -1` but we're considering adding `zonefile-load:
difference-no-serial`.
We've discussed stopping signing on the backup altogether and including
the zonefiles in the backup. The problem we have with this idea is that
problems with signing on the backup won't be discovered until it goes
active.
Are other people doing active-backup signers and how do you set it up?
.einar
Hi (again),
I was trying to backup and restore a server with the new knotc
zone-backup/restore command.
I recognized that only half of the private keys were in the backup,
which leads to an error:
2020-12-08T14:44:00+0100 error: [xxx.] DNSSEC, failed to load private
keys (not exists)
2020-12-08T14:44:00+0100 error: [xxx.] DNSSEC, failed to load keys (not
exists)
Shouldn't the backup contain all private keys?
Thanks,
Thomas