knot-dns-users Únor 2023

knot-dns-users@lists.nic.cz

4 participants
5 discussions

by Turritopsis Dohrnii Teo En Ming

Subject: GUI Frontends for Knot DNS Server Good day from Singapore, Are there any GUI frontends for configuring Knot DNS Server? I prefer GUI configuration interface. It is more efficient than command line interface (CLI). Thank you. Regards, Mr. Turritopsis Dohrnii Teo En Ming Targeted Individual in Singapore Blogs: https://tdtemcerts.blogspot.com https://tdtemcerts.wordpress.com

10 měsíců, 1 týden

kresd 5.4.4 socket bug

by Mike Wright

Hi, Just upgraded knot-resolver on ubuntu-22.04. It installs and runs but shows that the socket is not where it thinks it is. Socket is at /run/knot-resolver/control@1 but the new version is looking for it at /run/knot-resolver/control/1 systemctl status is available here: https://pastebin.com/56g22e2a Thanks for the great software! Mike Wright

1 rok, 10 měsíců

Why does knot need so much prodding to XFR and sign my zones?

by Jan-Piet Mens

Hello! Knot 3.2.0 with a Thales HSM configured this way: (btw, I am not obfuscating addresses or zone names -- these are actual testing names :) keystore: - id: thales backend: pkcs11 config: "pkcs11:token=XX;pin-value=XXX /opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/libcknfast.so" key-label: on policy: - id: manualHSM keystore: thales single-type-signing: off manual: on zone: - domain: tt05 dnssec-signing: on dnssec-policy: manualHSM master: pdns acl: [ xfr, notify_from_pdns ] The zone `tt05' exists on the primary and can be transferred, as the following logs will show. I start off by generating a KSK and a ZSK, and verify that the keys are actually on the HSM: $ keymgr tt05 generate algorithm=8 size=2048 ksk=yes zsk=no 579f877d1739efb7bcf551e41c8777e965f8416f $ keymgr tt05 generate algorithm=8 size=2048 ksk=no zsk=yes eb8ef53ebffbd9950bfa914f7f2b0f1cd43bbe63 $ cklist -n | grep tt05 CKA_LABEL "tt05. KSK" CKA_LABEL "tt05. ZSK" I now reload Knot, and at this point I am actually expecting the server to "see" the new zone, get the keys, perform the transfer (XFR) and sign the zone. But all that doesn't happen: $ knotc reload Reloaded 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 info: [tt05.] AXFR, incoming, remote 192.168.33.31@53, started 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 info: [tt05.] AXFR, incoming, remote 192.168.33.31@53, finished, 0.00 seconds, 3 messages, 377 bytes 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, key, tag 38930, algorithm RSASHA256, KSK, public, active 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, key, tag 511, algorithm RSASHA256, public, active 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 error: [tt05.] DNSSEC, failed to load private keys (not exists) 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 error: [tt05.] DNSSEC, failed to load keys (not exists) 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2023-02-09T13:10:10+0100 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 error: [tt05.] refresh, failed (not exists) 2023-02-09T12:10:10+0100 error: [tt05.] zone event 'refresh' failed (not exists) In the above, I don't understand why it's failed to load the keys. My _assumption_ is that the server has enumerated the keys from the HSM but did that before the two keys for this zone were created. Invoking `knotc zone-keys-load' doesn't alter the situation. I do understand the 'refresh' failing, as the zone tt05 doesn't as yet exist on this knot secondary. So I initiate a zone transfer: $ knotc zone-retransfer tt05 OK 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 info: [tt05.] control, received command 'zone-retransfer' 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 info: [tt05.] AXFR, incoming, remote 192.168.33.31@53, started 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 info: [tt05.] AXFR, incoming, remote 192.168.33.31@53, finished, 0.00 seconds, 3 messages, 377 bytes 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, key, tag 38930, algorithm RSASHA256, KSK, public, active 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, key, tag 511, algorithm RSASHA256, public, active 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 error: [tt05.] DNSSEC, failed to load private keys (not exists) 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 error: [tt05.] DNSSEC, failed to load keys (not exists) 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2023-02-09T13:11:04+0100 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 error: [tt05.] refresh, failed (not exists) 2023-02-09T12:11:04+0100 error: [tt05.] zone event 'refresh' failed (not exists) It is clear that the transfer succeeds (the logs on the primary corroborate this), and knot apparently knows the correct keys to use for the zone. Why is it not signing it? $ knotc zone-sign tt05 OK 2023-02-09T12:11:38+0100 info: [tt05.] control, received command 'zone-sign' 2023-02-09T12:11:38+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, dropping previous signatures, re-signing zone 2023-02-09T12:11:38+0100 error: [tt05.] zone event 're-sign' failed (invalid parameter) I now restart the server: # <restart knotd> 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: Knot DNS 3.2.0 starting 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: loaded configuration file '/etc/knot.conf', mapsize 500 MiB 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: using UDP reuseport, incoming TCP Fast Open 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: binding to interface 10.24.34.16@5353 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: changed directory to / 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: loading 7 zones 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: [tt05.] zone will be loaded 2023-02-09T12:12:16+0100 info: starting server 2023-02-09T12:12:18+0100 info: [tt05.] failed to parse zone file '/var/zones/tt05' (not exists) Here again, I understand it cannot parse the zone, because the transfer hasn't actually been comitted to disk. So I manually transfer: $ knotc zone-retransfer tt05 OK 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] control, received command 'zone-retransfer' 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] AXFR, incoming, remote 192.168.33.31@53, started 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] AXFR, incoming, remote 192.168.33.31@53, finished, 0.00 seconds, 3 messages, 377 bytes 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, key, tag 38930, algorithm RSASHA256, KSK, public, active 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, key, tag 511, algorithm RSASHA256, public, active 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, signing started 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, successfully signed 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] DNSSEC, next signing at 2023-02-23T11:13:24+0100 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] refresh, remote 192.168.33.31@53, zone updated, 0.44 seconds, serial none -> 2023010100, remote serial 2023010100, expires in 604800 seconds 2023-02-09T12:13:23+0100 info: [tt05.] zone file updated, serial 2023010100 And now the zone is signed. Is there some way to 'streamline' this? :-) Or am I just doing something wrong or being too impatient? Best regards, -JP

1 rok, 10 měsíců

Knot DNS 3.2.5 release

by Daniel Salzman

Hello Knot DNS users, CZ.NIC has released Knot DNS 3.2.5! This is mostly a bugfix version. Changelog: https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/raw/v3.2.5/NEWS Download: https://www.knot-dns.cz/download/ Documentation: https://www.knot-dns.cz/documentation/ Support: https://www.knot-dns.cz/support/ Regards, Daniel

1 rok, 10 měsíců

PKCS#11 label is not set on keys created by Knot

by Jan-Piet Mens

I note that the key label is not set when Knot generates new keys via PKCS#11. Invoking `p11tool --list-all' shows a key as Object 449: URL: pkcs11:model=;manufacturer=nCipher%20Corp.%20Ltd;serial=xxx;\ token=YYY;\ id=%04%66%D0%9C%0D%9E%24%D9%79%0A%17%D3%5D%A0%CC%5A%3F%E2%A3%26;\ type=public Type: Public key (RSA-2048) Label: ID: 04:66:d0:9c:0d:9e:24:d9:79:0a:17:d3:5d:a0:cc:5a:3f:e2:a3:26 The ID is that which `keymgr list' displays (with colons in it), but the label is empty. Is this by design? Would it be possible for Knot to actually set the label (e.g. zone name - key type: example.com-ksk)? Best regards, -JP

1 rok, 10 měsíců

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