Hello,I run a small public DNSSEC-validating recursive resolver on Knot Resolver 6.4.2 and hit an eleven-minute outage that I think is a bug in expiring prefetch. I have aggregate metrics across the whole event but no query-level data, for reasons I explain at the end. I would appreciate a steer on whether this is known, and on the two questions at the bottom. WHAT HAPPENED ------------- On 2026-08-13 between 04:01 and 04:12 UTC:   - resolver_request_internal_total rose from a steady 1.34/s to a peak     of 10,901/s and stayed elevated for about eleven minutes   - the workers logged 285,480 "[system] error: stack overflow" messages,     peaking at 94,675 in a single minute   - the resolver stopped answering; my end-to-end probes failed on all     six transport/family combinations at 04:08, 04:10 and 04:14   - it ended on its own at 04:12 and has not recurred since Client query rate never changed. Roughly 6.5 million internal requests were generated in ten minutes against a real client demand of about 8.6 queries per second. No worker crashed or restarted. MEASUREMENTS ------------ At the peak, against the same counters ten hours later:                                         peak        normal   resolver_request_internal_total       5,204/s     1.34/s     (max sample)                       10,901/s   resolver_request_udp+tcp_total            8.6/s      8.9/s   dnsdist_queries (real client demand)      7.5/s      7.7/s   resolver_answer_total                 4,800/s      10.3/s   cache hit ratio                          0.06%       ~30%   CPU busy                                   30%         3%   load1                                     2.06       0.25   p99 resolver_response_latency             1.5s       0.4s Per worker, over the burst:   kresd0        0 overflow messages   kresd1   92,474   kresd2   90,143   kresd3  102,863 One worker in four was completely untouched, which I cannot explain. RESOURCE EFFECT --------------- Memory available fell from 2,862 MB to 622 MB and the kernel swapped 1,798 MB. The three affected workers were exactly the three that ended up in swap (596, 537 and 524 MB) and each took roughly 240,000 major page faults, against 30 for the entire process lifetime before the event. The resolver was serving its LMDB cache from disk for the ten hours until I restarted the container. ENVIRONMENT -----------   Version    6.4.2.dev1+f73d6f  (kresd --version)   Image      cznic/knot-resolver, tag v6.4.2              sha256:b589bfe67a61e2d3c1d6ea3836904e4ed2ec70c77c5db9127473              ed092d31d638   Deployed   Docker, host networking, non-root, read-only root filesystem   Workers    4   Host       4 vCPU, 3852 MB RAM, Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-29   Cache      LMDB, size-max 1536M, persistent   Role       recursive resolver behind dnsdist 2.1.1 over loopback Relevant configuration:   workers: 4   logging:     level: info     groups: [system, module, devel, io]   cache:     size-max: 1536M     prefetch:       expiring: true          # prediction deliberately left disabled   options:     minimize: true serve-stale is NOT enabled, so this is not issue #957. WHAT I RULED OUT ----------------   - Not client-driven. dnsdist_queries is flat across the whole window.     No query spike, no new source, no rate-limit rule hit.   - Not a crash. No worker restarted; the only spawn lines in the     container log are from process start.   - Not serve_stale (#957). Not enabled.   - Not cache exhaustion. LMDB is 1536 MB and was not full.   - Not a one-off message. Isolated "stack overflow" lines occur at a     background rate of roughly 0.1/hour, on 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 alike,     without any internal-request spike. Only this event showed the     runaway. Possibly two related phenomena. I also enabled debug logging for the system, module, devel and io groups before this happened. They show no precursor at all: normal traffic, then stack overflow messages at microsecond intervals. HYPOTHESIS ---------- This is a guess about mechanism rather than a diagnosis. Prefetch of expiring records is, as I understand it, answer-triggered: a record is refreshed when the resolver answers with it at under 1% TTL or under 5 seconds remaining. If a prefetch's own resolution itself answers with a near-expired record, that would trigger a further prefetch, and the loop could sustain itself with no client involvement. What I can state from the data is only that internal request generation became self-sustaining and decoupled from demand. QUESTIONS --------- 1. Is "[system] error: stack overflow" a caught Lua or LuaJIT stack    limit? Is the affected request abandoned, or retried? A retry would    explain the self-sustaining behaviour. 2. Is there any rate limit or de-duplication on expiring prefetch, or a    guard preventing a prefetch from triggering further prefetches? 3. Does one worker of four being entirely unaffected suggest per-worker    state as the trigger? WHAT I CAN PROVIDE ------------------ The service has a published no-query-logging policy, so query names and client addresses were never captured and do not exist. I realise that is the first thing you would normally ask for, and I am sorry not to have it. I do have:   - full system/io/module/devel debug logs for the window, about 40 MB,     containing only upstream authoritative server addresses   - Prometheus series for any exported counter across the event   - the complete configuration I am happy to run with cache.prefetch.expiring set to false to confirm the association, or to carry a patch or an extra debug group if that would help narrow it down. The resolver is low-traffic and I can experiment on it freely. Thanks for your time, and for the resolver.