Good morning,
ISC bind is strict about CNAME of NS server:
skipping nameserver 'aa.bb.cz' because it is a CNAME, while resolving
'9.4/4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa/PTR'.
How about Knot resolver ?
Thanks and best regards
J.Karliak
Howdy,
I’m trying to get Knot 3.3.5 to use authenticated DNSSEC bootstrapping following the blog article and docs. However, I’m getting an error for the signalling zones, but I fail to figure out what I may have overlooked.
error: [_signal.ns2.droso.dk <http://signal.ns2.droso.dk/>.] module 'mod-onlinesign/authsignal', incompatible with automatic signing
Relevant knot.conf snippets (in order):
policy:
- id: ecc
algorithm: ecdsap256sha256
nsec3: on
rrsig-refresh: 7d
mod-onlinesign:
- id: authsignal
nsec-bitmap: [CDS, CDNSKEY]
policy: ecc
template:
- id: default
…
dnssec-signing: on
dnssec-policy: ecc
…
zone:
- domain: _signal.ns2.droso.dk <http://signal.ns2.droso.dk/>
module: [mod-authsignal, mod-onlinesign/authsignal]
Any hint appreciated
Best
Erwin
Hi,
I have a use case, where today we’re running BIND and a daemon uses rndc to create/remove/update zones on secondary servers.
According to `man knotc` knotc only supports UNIX sockets (old ubuntu man page showed ‘-p’ parameter to specify port).
I know I could use a catalog zone, but that would be a bigger change than I prefer right now. The primary server is running BIND+DLZ
with a PostgreSQL backend. Replacing the primary is on the roadmap, but for now, I just want to replace the secondaries.
Is there a good way to remotely add zones to a knot secondary?
.einar
Hello,
When doing something quite dramatic in knot.conf like adding and/or removing a zone, is "knotc reload" a suitable approach to honour those changes or would you recommend restarting the whole process?
"knotc reload" seems to work just fine in test, I'm just looking for some further confidence I suppose.
Thanks
Angus
debian 12
# uname -a
Linux rip.psg.com 6.1.0-18-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Debian 6.1.76-1 (2024-02-01) x86_64 GNU/Linux
# knotc --version
knotc (Knot DNS), version 3.2.6
AXFR of a 750k zone from seattle to, lebanon, europe, iceland, southern
africa, ...) fails over v5 and v6, i.e. somewhat larger rtt
same AXFR seattle seattle or seattle to ashburn works v4 and v6.
seattle to dallas v4 good, v6 fails, but it smells of an HE.net hop.
when it fails, it is always within a hundred or so mytes of the same
place, approximately 10% through the file.
pcap of seattle->beirut at https://archive.psg.com/240323.beirut.pcap
the last payload is in frame 217. at 219, seattle (b) sends a
FIN/PSH/ACK. then at 251, after acking everything, beirut (nabil)
FIN/ACKs seattle's FIN and we're dead.
i am not positive this is the key question as my tcp fu is a bit rusty.
but why did seattle send the FIN at 219, 10% through the file?
randy
in
address: [185.91.97.18, 2a05:e380:2:4::2] # nabil.beirutix.net
if this is a tab character ^
# knotc conf-check
error: config, file '/etc/knot/knot.conf', line 324, item 'address', value '2a05:e380:2:4::2' (tabulator character is not allowed)
blanks are ok
# knotc --version
knotc (Knot DNS), version 3.2.6
yes, that is the latest on debian 12
randy
server runs a tld as primary, but slds are hidden primaries which the
server pulls as a secondary, wants to sign bump-in-the-wire, and then
make available to public secondaries. i think that the doc says this is
doable, but instructions are insufficiently explicit for this idjit.
i am fetching the slds into
policy:
- id: pol-256-256
algorithm: rsasha256 # was ecdsap256sha256 sra uses ecdsap384sha384
manual: on
...
template:
- id: signed
storage: /var/lib/knot/sec-sign
dnssec-signing: on
dnssec-policy: pol-256-256
zonefile-sync: -1
zonefile-load: difference
journal-content: all
serial-policy: unixtime
...
zone:
- domain: sld.tld
file: tld.sld # sorry, i like alpha sort in `ls` :)
master: hidden-fetch
template: signed
acl: [allow-local, secondaries-push]
the policy and template are those from signing primary zone; which i
suspect is ill advised.
i did generate keying as i would when signing a primary zone
# keymgr sld.tld generate algorithm=rsasha256 ksk=yes zsk=yes
7a618eaf94ea1d903233cb547faa24bae8cb49a5
# knotc zone-reload sld.tld
OK
# keymgr sld.tld ds
sld.tld. DS 63562 8 2 2d25e465f131900413d7e8a90ad1b96c75ba835de63dfee08610b113a779d41f
sld.tld. DS 63562 8 4 ed9c31c495703ec354f1a1835c9878339224cc06ac3001151c2ebb89524b25190efa424348c999b0c4df940edffa8409
any kind soul(s) care to whack me with a clue bat?
randy
I got a report of an NSEC error from someone who tried to connect to a
mistyped hostname. I've done a bit of poking, and it looks like we're
seeing a missing wildcard NSEC for domain names that are two subdomains
down from the apex, but not for subdomains of the apex. Though, I admit I
can't see the problem myself. Querying by hand I see what looks like an
identical response, but resolvers and DNSViz report problems with the
deeper name.
For example, nonexistent.dns-oarc.net and nonexistent.sjc.dns-oarc.net (
sjc.dns-oarc.net is a real subdomain with hosts in it, not an ENT)... kdig
output and DNSViz results below.
We're running knot/unknown,now 3.3.5-cznic.1~bullseye from deb.knot-dns.cz,
and this is the relevant policy statement for the zone:
policy:
- id: ecdsa
algorithm: ecdsap256sha256
ksk-lifetime: 365d
ksk-submission: parent_zone_sbm
zsk-lifetime: 30d
rrsig-lifetime: 14d
rrsig-refresh: 7d
We are mid-KSK-roll, waiting on the DS submission check.
Have I misconfigured something here, or is there a signing bug, or is this
something else?
Thanks!
Matt
---
nonexistent.sjc.dns-oarc.net: DNSviz reports this is fine.
<https://dnsviz.net/d/nonexistent.dns-oarc.net/ZfNH1w/dnssec/>
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY; status: NXDOMAIN; id: 9380
;; Flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1; ANSWER: 0; AUTHORITY: 6; ADDITIONAL: 1
;; EDNS PSEUDOSECTION:
;; Version: 0; flags: do; UDP size: 1232 B; ext-rcode: NOERROR
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;; nonexistent.dns-oarc.net. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN SOA ns1.dns-oarc.net. hostmaster.dns-oarc.net.
2024031400 300 60 604800 3600
nfsen.dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN NSEC ns.dns-oarc.net. A AAAA RRSIG NSEC
dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN NSEC fs1.10g.dns-oarc.net. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA
RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY CDS CDNSKEY CAA
dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 14400 20240328021935
20240314004935 6048 dns-oarc.net. [omitted]
nfsen.dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 3 3600 20240326215132
20240312202132 6048 dns-oarc.net. [omitted]
dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 2 3600 20240322045130
20240308032130 6048 dns-oarc.net. [omitted]
;; Received 518 B
;; Time 2024-03-14 18:57:33 UTC
;; From 64.191.0.128@53(UDP) in 0.3 ms
nonexistent.sjc.dns-oarc.net: resolvers and DNSViz report a missing
wildcard NSEC
<https://dnsviz.net/d/nonexistent.sjc.dns-oarc.net/ZfNH6w/dnssec/>
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY; status: NXDOMAIN; id: 660
;; Flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1; ANSWER: 0; AUTHORITY: 6; ADDITIONAL: 1
;; EDNS PSEUDOSECTION:
;; Version: 0; flags: do; UDP size: 1232 B; ext-rcode: NOERROR
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;; nonexistent.sjc.dns-oarc.net. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN SOA ns1.dns-oarc.net. hostmaster.dns-oarc.net.
2024031400 300 60 604800 3600
newmail.sjc.dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN NSEC pdu-7301.sjc.dns-oarc.net. A AAAA
RRSIG NSEC
shin-cubes.dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN NSEC an1.10g.sjc.dns-oarc.net. A AAAA
RRSIG NSEC
dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 14400 20240328021935
20240314004935 6048 dns-oarc.net. [omitted]
newmail.sjc.dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 4 3600 20240326215132
20240312202132 6048 dns-oarc.net. [omitted]
shin-cubes.dns-oarc.net. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 3 3600 20240326215132
20240312202132 6048 dns-oarc.net. [omitted]
;; Received 544 B
;; Time 2024-03-14 18:57:33 UTC
;; From 64.191.0.128@53(UDP) in 0.3 ms
Hi folks,
Is it possible to chain multiple upstream catalog zones into one downstream one?
I do have the following topology:
Multiple DNS hidden masters <-> DNS signer / DNS master for public facing slaves <-> public facing slaves
Can I define catalog zones on hidden masters and use them on public-facing signer/master to compose a catalog zone for the slaves?
Best Regards,
Martin Hunek
Freenet Liberec, z.s.
